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In Memoriam

Judge Murphy’s Indian Law Legacy
Kirsten Matoy Carlson†
INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian law profoundly shapes the daily lives of
American Indians.1 The United States has dealt legally with Indian nations or tribes by treating them as separate sovereign
governments since its formation. Before the end of the treaty period in 1871, the United States entered into some 400 treaties
with Indian tribes, acknowledging their preexisting and ongoing
† Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. Ph.D. 2007
(political science), The University of Michigan; J.D. 2003, The University of
Michigan Law School; M.A. 1999, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand (Fulbright scholar); B.A. 1997, The Johns Hopkins University; law clerk to
Judge Murphy for the 2003–04 term; Cherokee Nation (not enrolled). I thank
Tom Peckham (clerk to Judge Murphy for the 1994–96 term) and the Honorable
Cami Fraser for their helpful insights and comments on this tribute and Colette
Routel, Tadd Johnson, the Office of the Chief Executive of the Mille Lacs Band
of Ojibwe, and especially, the Honorable Melanie Benjamin, Chief Executive of
the Mille Lacs Band, for deepening my understanding of the Mille Lacs case.
Copyright © 2018 by Kirsten Matoy Carlson.
1. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1123, 1124
(1994) (noting “the unusually great impact of law on Native American group
life”). Several scholars have documented how federal Indian law empowered the
Bureau of Indian Affairs to encroach on the daily lives of American Indians. See,
e.g., Reid Peyton Chambers, Reflections on the Changes in Indian Law, Federal
Indian Policies and Conditions on Indian Reservations Since the Late 1960s, 46
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 729, 734 (2014) (noting that the Bureau of Indian Affairs “controlled many, perhaps most, actions by tribes and reservation Indians”); Warren
H. Cohen & Philip J. Mause, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1818, 1820 (1968) (“Although the normal expectation in American society
is that a private individual or group may do anything unless it is specifically
prohibited by the government, it might be said that the normal expectation on
the reservation is that the Indians may not do anything unless it is specifically
permitted by the government.”); Donald L. Fixico, Witness to Change: Fifty
Years of Indian Activism and Tribal Politics, in BEYOND RED POWER: AMERICAN
INDIAN POLITICS AND ACTIVISM SINCE 1900, at 2, 8 (Daniel M. Cobb & Loretta
Fowler eds., 2007) (“During the first fifty years of the twentieth century, Native
people had limited influence. The Bureau of Indian Affairs controlled their lives.
As we say, BIA stood for ‘Boss Indians Around.’”).
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rights and governmental authority.2 These treaty relationships
(and subsequent agreements), along with federal legislation and
Supreme Court decisions, form the basic legal framework governing the relationships among two distinct groups of people—
Indians and non-Indians—in the United States today. The key
elements of this framework include: federal recognition of the inherent governmental authority possessed by Indian tribes,
which usually supplants state powers on Indian lands; a federal
trust obligation toward and special federal powers over Indian
tribes and their citizens; and federally protected lands designated for Indian tribes.3
The United States, however, has not always honored this
government-to-government relationship or the treaties and
agreements it made with Indian nations.4 Federal Indian laws
and policies have varied tremendously over time, including periods when the goal was to destroy tribal organizations and even
Indians themselves.5 Federal judges have faced the unenviable
task of interpreting these laws and policies.6 They have made
countless decisions that have had monumental, and often irreversible, consequences for Indian nations and their people.7
Few federal judges try to understand federal Indian law
even though it affects the daily lives of millions of people and the
sovereign rights of 573 federally recognized American Indian
and Alaska Native nations. Even fewer recognize and appreciate
Indian nations as sovereign governments, attempt to comprehend their distinctive worldviews, and translate those realities
into terms cognizable by a foreign Western legal system.
The summer after my first year in law school, I was preparing to apply for a federal judicial clerkship and looking for that
rare federal judge with an expertise in federal Indian law. I
asked Reid Peyton Chambers, one of the partners at the boutique
2. CHARLES E. CLELAND ET AL., FAITH IN PAPER: THE ETHNOHISTORY AND
LITIGATION OF UPPER GREAT LAKES INDIAN TREATIES 13 (2011).
3. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 1123–26.
4. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 560–62 (1903).
5. For a discussion of these policies, see DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 140–243 (6th ed. 2011).
6. See INDIAN LAW STORIES 1 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the complex nature of Indian law); see also MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 219–23 (2016) (discussing the canons of treaty construction
that federal judges use to interpret Indian treaties).
7. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 1, at 1126, 1228–29, 1135–36, 1143–
44 (highlighting the real life impact that U.S. Supreme Court decisions have
had on Indian peoples).

2018]

JUDGE MURPHY’S INDIAN LAW LEGACY

39

Indian law firm where I was clerking, if he knew any judges that
would fit that description. He enthusiastically responded: Judge
Diana Murphy of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. I applied to Judge Murphy. I believe Judge Murphy was
interested in me because of my interest in federal Indian law and
her commitment to increasing diversity on the federal bench.8 I
was honored to serve as Judge Murphy’s law clerk after I finished law school.9
Mr. Chambers’s response indicates the high esteem with
which Indian law practitioners, scholars, and tribal leaders regarded Judge Murphy and her contributions to Indian country—
and that was in 2001. This respect for Judge Murphy has only
grown over time. During her thirty-plus years on the federal
bench, Judge Murphy heard nearly fifty cases and wrote almost
two dozen opinions related to federal Indian law.10 Her Indian
law jurisprudence reflects her remarkable ability to tackle complicated factual and historical patterns, to read closely and identify the relevant facts in their historical context, to apply the law
precisely to those facts, and to value and give voice to cultures
and ways of life distinct from her own. These attributes, while
particularly important to her expertise in federal Indian law,
also distinguished her as a fair and thoughtful judge more generally.

8. See Barbara L. Jones, Attorneys of the Year: Judge Diana Murphy,
MINN. LAW. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://minnlawyer.com/2018/02/08/attorneys-of-the
-year-judge-diana-murphy (noting Judge Murphy’s commitment to promoting
gender diversity in the law). Judge Murphy demonstrated her interest in promoting diversity while I clerked for her. My family is from the Cherokee Nation,
but I am not enrolled. Throughout my clerkship, she talked with me about my
experiences. In particular, I recall several conversations we had about my upcoming wedding because my fiancé and I were beading our regalia and making
giveaway gifts for a traditional Anishinaabe ceremony, consistent with the traditions of his community. At her request, I brought the shawl I beaded to chambers to show her.
9. Ironically, although a mutual interest in federal Indian law drew Judge
Murphy to my application, no significant Indian law cases came before her the
year I clerked.
10. The author generated this number from data collected from LexisNexis.
It includes all cases with reported opinions, but excludes cases that only reviewed the convictions or sentences of individuals convicted of crimes in Indian
country (the author found sixty-five of these cases). The author used Lexis Advance to generate all the cases that Judge Murphy heard as a judge on the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. The author then searched within these results for any cases
involving “Indians” or “tribes.” She then went through every case to confirm
that it dealt with Indians or tribes.
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Part I of this Article highlights Judge Murphy’s federal Indian law jurisprudence and its real world impact. To focus solely
on Judge Murphy’s opinions, however, would overlook the substantial contribution she made to Indian country as the Chair of
the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Part II discusses the Judge’s
instrumental role in transforming the U.S. Sentencing Commission from a body largely unaware of Indian issues into one attempting to take its responsibilities to, and effects on, Indian nations and their citizens seriously.
I. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS
IMPACT
Judge Murphy significantly shaped modern federal Indian
law through her insightful and well-crafted opinions.11 Arising
out of a unique body of law, Indian law cases often present lawyers and judges with special challenges. The 573 federally recognized American Indian and Alaska Native nations in the United
States vary widely in terms of culture, size, region, and history.
Indian tribes neither resemble, nor want to resemble other
Americans or even necessarily each other. Unlike most groups
in the United States, Indian nations often resist the inclusive
tendencies of the democratic nation-state and seek recognition of
their status as separate sovereigns.12

11. Judge Murphy participated in several of the most significant Indian law
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court during her tenure as a federal judge. She
wrote opinions in at least five cases later heard by the Supreme Court. Yankton
Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 577 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, withdrawn by 606 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2010); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 554 U.S. 316 (2008);
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass Cty., 108 F.3d 820 (8th Cir.
1997), rev’d in part, 524 U.S. 103 (1998); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. S. Mo. Waste
Mgmt. Dist., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 141 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 1998);
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784 (D. Minn.
1994). She participated either as one of the judges on the panel or in en banc
proceedings in at least two more cases. United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th
Cir. 2003), rev’d, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930
(8th Cir. 1996).
12. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 27–40, 59–60, 65
(1995) (arguing that forcibly assimilating Indian tribes into American culture
and society diminishes the tribes’ ability to have the separate and distinct identities which they desire); see also GETCHES ET AL., supra note 5, at 26–28 (discussing the Indian resistance to forced assimilation into American society).
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Federal Indian law further challenges judges because it has
developed out of encounters between Europeans and Indian nations already residing in the Americas.13 These interactions often lead to cultural misunderstandings, many of which persist
in relationships among Indian nations, federal and state governments, and local communities. These misunderstandings often
end up in the federal courts. They ask judges to comprehend distinctive, tribal worldviews and translate those realities into the
terms of a foreign Western legal system.14 Judges frequently
struggle to understand tribal ways and to legally define the relationships among these distinct nations and the federal, state,
and local governments with whom they must deal. Like the other
two branches of the federal government, judges face a constant
tension in federal Indian law between the inclination to treat all
Indian nations (and land) alike, and the legal and historical distinctions that make each unique.
The variety and complexity of federal Indian law cases also
frequently challenge judges. The disputes arising in federal Indian law cover almost every area of substantive law from contracts to torts to property to healthcare. They often also include
legal issues specific to the federal-tribal relationship, such as fiduciary duties, sovereignty, treaties, and intergovernmental relations. Indian law cases often raise complicated and novel legal
claims, include multiple parties, and sometimes involve a century or more of relevant history.
This specialized and complicated area of the law never fazed
Judge Murphy. Her majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions covered a wide range of topics, including, inter alia, land

13. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 5, at 43. See generally Taiawagi Helton
& Lindsay G. Robertson, The Foundations of Federal Indian Law and Its Application in the Twentieth Century, in BEYOND RED POWER, supra note 1, at 33,
33–55 (discussing the evolution of Indian law since the founding of the United
States).
14. Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming
Tribal Property Law, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 492–96 (2001) (explaining
how Cherokee views of property clash with Anglo-American concepts of property). See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Listen, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 523
(1998) (describing the author’s experience of being an American Indian in law
school).
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into trust,15 taxation,16 gaming,17 tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction,18 tribal sovereign immunity,19 treaty rights,20 reservation boundaries,21 and criminal jurisdiction.22 As a result, her
opinions reached almost every area of federal Indian law and
had important practical implications in the daily lives of American Indians.23

15. Cty. of Charles Mix v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.
2012); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated, 106 F.3d 247 (8th Cir. 1996).
16. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa v. Frans, 649 F.3d 849
(8th Cir. 2011); Campbell v. Comm’r, 164 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999); Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass Cty., 108 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552 (8th
Cir. 1997).
17. Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 812 F.3d 648 (8th
Cir. 2016); Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 785 F.3d
1207 (8th Cir. 2015); Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa,
702 F.3d 1147 (8th Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Bernard v. Casino Magic
Corp., 384 F.3d 510 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb.,
324 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 2003); Gaming World Int’l, Ltd. v. White Earth Band of
Chippewa Indians, 317 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. Bernard
v. Casino Magic Corp., 293 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Santee
Sioux Tribe, 254 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe,
135 F.3d 558 (8th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Steele v. Turn Key Gaming,
Inc., 135 F.3d 1249 (8th Cir. 1998); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney,
88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996).
18. DISH Network Serv. L.L.C. v. Laducer, 725 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2013);
Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in
Iowa, 609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010); Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2008);
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 491 F.3d 878 (8th
Cir. 2007); Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990 (8th
Cir. 1999); Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087
(8th Cir. 1998); A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996).
19. Alltel Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. DeJordy, 675 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2012).
20. United States v. Brown, 777 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2015); Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994).
21. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky, 577 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2009); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1999); Yankton Sioux Tribe
v. S. Mo. Waste Mgmt. Dist., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996).
22. United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 541 U.S. 193
(2004).
23. Judge Murphy authored several powerful concurrences and dissents.
See, e.g., Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa v. Frans, 649 F.3d 849,
853–57 (8th Cir. 2011) (dissent); Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848, 857–59 (8th Cir.
2008) (concurrence); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 885–
91 (8th Cir. 1995) (dissent). For example, the Supreme Court vacated the opinion she dissented from in South Dakota v. U.S. Department of Interior, which
held that the U.S. Secretary of the Interior did not have the authority to take
land into trust for Indians under 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012). U.S. Dep’t of Interior
v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996). Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the
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Two of Judge Murphy’s most influential Indian law decisions are discussed here. They highlight Judge Murphy’s contributions to federal Indian law as both a trial court and an appellate judge. These cases provide a window into the tremendous
contribution that she made to Indian country. At their core, both
cases are about Indian nations fighting to survive as distinct peoples with their own governments in a rapidly changing world. As
these cases show, Judge Murphy played a key role in ensuring
that survival.
A. TREATY RIGHTS: MILLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS V.
MINNESOTA
Judge Murphy distinguished herself as an exceptional Indian law jurist in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota by parsing a dense historical record to identify Chippewa
voices and translate Chippewa experiences into terms cognizable
under Western law. As the trial court judge that originally heard
the case, she faithfully applied the canons of treaty construction
to uphold the rights of Indians to hunt, fish, and gather off reservation.24 Her opinion both reiterated the vitality of the canons
of construction and demonstrated their intended application to
Indian treaties to protect tribal rights. The Supreme Court
heard the case on the merits and affirmed her findings in 1999.25
The case remains one of the most important treaty rights cases
decided in modern times.
For generations, the Potawatomi, the Odawa, and the
Ojibwe (Chippewa), collectively known as the Anishinaabek or
Three Fires Confederacy, have thrived in what is now known as
the Great Lakes region of the United States and Canada.26 They
continue to live abundantly off the land, hunting, fishing, and
harvesting wild berries, manoomin (wild rice), and maple

Eighth Circuit rejected a similar challenge to the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to take land into trust. South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d
790, 799–801 (8th Cir. 2005).
24. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F.Supp.
784, 830–33 (D. Minn. 1994).
25. See generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526
U.S. 172 (1999) (holding that the Chippewa Indians retained the usufructuary
rights guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty).
26. See EDWARD BENTON-BANAI, THE MISHOMIS BOOK: THE VOICE OF THE
OJIBWAY 98–102 (1988) (explaining the origins of the Anishinaabek in the Great
Lakes region).
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sugar.27 These natural resources have sustained the Anishinaabek both physically and spiritually for generations.28
Starting in the early nineteenth century, the United States
sought to obtain Anishinaabek lands in the Great Lakes. In
1837, the United States negotiated a treaty to purchase lands in
Wisconsin and Minnesota from several bands of Ojibwe, or Chippewa, Indians.29 The 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa ceded
lands in Wisconsin and Minnesota, but the Chippewa retained
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded lands.30 The
Chippewa continued hunting, fishing, and gathering on these
lands even though the state attempted to regulate these activities.31 They endured state prosecutions for hunting and fishing
because they did not interpret subsequent treaties or actions by
the federal government as altering the rights they retained under the 1837 Treaty and were determined to keep exercising
their treaty rights.32
After attempting to negotiate with the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the 1980s, the Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians33 and several of its citizens sued the
State of Minnesota, the Minnesota DNR, and various state officials in 1990.34 They sought a declaratory judgment that they
27. See id. at 101. See generally EDWARD BENTON-BANAI, ANISHINAABE ALLIVING THROUGH THE SEASONS (2008) [hereinafter ANISHINAABE AL(describing seasonal Anishinaabek hunting and gathering practices).
Anishinaabek prophecies predicted their migration to the Great Lakes, where
they found manoomin or “the food that grows on the water.” BENTON-BANAI,
supra note 26, at 94–102 (recounting the Anishinaabek migration).
28. ANISHINAABE ALMANAC, supra note 27; Wenona Singel & Matthew
Fletcher, Indian Treaties and the Survival of the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1285, 1285–88 (2006) (advocating for the preservation of the Great
Lakes as a resource for the Anishinaabek); Marc Slonim, Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians et al. v. State of Minnesota et al., in CLELAND ET AL., supra
note 2, at 134 (detailing the Indian interest in the region).
29. Treaty with the Chippewa 1837, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 537, reprinted in
2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 491–93 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904).
30. Id. at art. 5.
31. Kari Krogseng, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 771, 774–75 (2000).
32. Pat Doyle, An Issue of Fishing Rites; Tribal Members Tell How Their
Activities Both Sustain Them, Clash with the State, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
June 24, 1994, at 1A.
33. When Judge Murphy decided Mille Lacs in 1994, the Band currently
known as the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe was known as the Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa.
34. Judge Murphy bifurcated the case into two phases. Phase I would determine whether, and to what extent, the Mille Lacs Band retained its rights
under the treaty. Phase II would determine the ability of the State to regulate
MANAC:
MANAC]
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retained their hunting, fishing, and gathering rights under the
1837 Treaty and an injunction preventing the state from interfering with those rights. The United States intervened as a
plaintiff and nine counties and six landowners intervened as defendants in the suit.35
This highly public and controversial case revealed a
longstanding, serious conflict between state regulators and the
Band. Like related treaty litigation in Wisconsin and Michigan,36 the conflict generated tremendous hostility towards
American Indians.37 The slogan “Save a Walleye; Spear an Indian,” adopted by opponents to tribal fishing rights, became
ubiquitous throughout the Great Lakes.38 The Mille Lacs case,
like the fishing disputes in Wisconsin and Michigan, pitted state
regulators and sports fisherman against the Anishinaabek and
threatened to alter the status quo by calling into question the
regulation of fishing activities on Mille Lacs Lake, one of the
most popular and lucrative walleye fishing lakes in Minnesota.39
The Mille Lacs Band asserted their governmental authority to
regulate hunting, fishing, and gathering by their own peoples.
This authority ensures their ability to protect and maintain their
way of life, as fresh fish, game, manoomin (wild rice), and
ode’imin (strawberries) have to be gathered for ceremonies. They
also wanted to preserve traditional forms of fishing, including
gill netting and spear fishing, which the state had outlawed.40
To avoid protracted litigation, the Minnesota DNR negotiated a settlement with the Band. Both sides compromised in
reaching the agreement, but the Minnesota Legislature refused
any retained rights. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F.
Supp. 784 (D. Minn. 1994).
35. Id.
36. Wisconsin bands had previously sued the state of Wisconsin and prevailed on similar claims under the 1837 Treaty in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). See also
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that
the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan maintained fishing rights in the
waters of the Great Lakes).
37. CLELAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 7; Protests, GREAT LAKES INDIAN FISH
& WILDLIFE COMMISSION, http://www.glifwc.org/TreatyRights/protest.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
38. Protests, supra note 37. For a fuller discussion of these conflicts, see
LARRY NESPER, THE WALLEYE WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR OJIBWE SPEARFISHING
AND TREATY RIGHTS (2002).
39. Pat Doyle, Tribal Fishing on Mille Lacs: Who’s in Control, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 13, 1994, at 1B.
40. See CLELAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 134.
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to approve it.41 Some legislators feared that traditional Chippewa forms of gill netting and spear fishing would harm the environment and deter tourism.42 Negotiations ended, and the litigation resumed.43
Judge Murphy’s rulings during the three-week trial on the
merits in the Mille Lacs case demonstrate her trial management
skills, commitment to a fair judicial process, and exceptional
ability to acknowledge the unique lived experiences of Indian
peoples.44 First, Judge Murphy ensured that members of the
Mille Lacs Band—and not just its lawyers and experts—had an
opportunity to be heard. Despite objections raised by the defendants, three members of the Mille Lacs Band testified.45 They
shared their personal knowledge about the significance of fishing, hunting, and gathering to the physical, spiritual, and cultural survival of the Anishinaabek and explained how state regulation threatened the continuation of their way of life.46 In
allowing this testimony and treating Mille Lacs Band members
as experts, Judge Murphy recognized the importance of these
rights to the lived experiences and cultural vibrancy of contemporary Chippewa. The rights retained in the 1837 Treaty were
not relics of a romanticized past, but an integral part of modern
Chippewa life. Second, she limited the trial to the relevant issues
when she rejected the defendants’ request for records on casino
gaming by the Band.47 She refused to let popular misconceptions
about Indian gaming cloud the issue of whether the Chippewa
retained rights under the 1837 Treaty.48 In contrast to popular
41. Id. at 135.
42. Minnesota Issues Resource Guides: American Indian Fishing and Hunting Rights, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR., https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/
guides/guides?issue=indian (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); see also Catherine M.
Ovsak, Reaffirming the Guarantee: Indian Treaty Rights to Hunt and Fish OffReservation in Minnesota, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1178, 1201–04
(1994).
43. Ovsak, supra note 42, at 1202–03.
44. Prior to the trial, Judge Murphy decided several pretrial motions. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 853 F. Supp. 1118, 1123, 1147
(D. Minn. 1994).
45. Doyle, supra note 32.
46. Id.
47. Pat Doyle, Judge in Treaty Case Rejects Request for Indian Casino Data,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 28, 1994, at 1A.
48. Id. Other federal judges have not shown similar acumen about what
facts are relevant in Indian law cases. For example, the majority opinion in
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556 (2013), starts by noting the
child’s low percentage of Indian blood, a fact entirely irrelevant to whether the
Indian Child Welfare Act applied to her adoption proceeding. See id. at 2560.
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rhetoric suggesting that the Chippewa no longer needed their
treaty rights because they had a casino,49 her rulings in the case
recognized that hunting, fishing, and gathering are more than
economic activities to the Chippewa.
After trial, Judge Murphy faced the unenviable task of reviewing a historical record spanning over 150 years to determine
whether the federal government had abrogated the Chippewa’s
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The canons of treaty construction make such inquiries no easy feat. The canons instruct
judges to: (1) liberally interpret treaties in favor of the Indians
or tribes in question; (2) construe Indian treaties as the Indians
would have understood them; (3) resolve doubtful or ambiguous
treaty terms in favor of the Indians; and (4) interpret treaty provisions that are not clear on their face by using surrounding circumstances or history.50 Judges have to interpret a treaty from
the parties’ point of view, and yet Indian treaties were often
drafted with a historical record only documenting the non-Indian
point of view.51
On August 24, 1994, Judge Murphy handed down the historic ruling that the Chippewa retained the rights of hunting,
fishing, and gathering in the territory ceded to the United States
by the treaty of 1837.52 She made several important and detailed

Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2012), a child’s eligibility for tribal enrollment determines the applicability of the Act, and it is
well established federal law that tribes determine their own enrollment criteria.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978). Some tribes require a
certain blood quantum while others do not. See KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, TRIBES AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MEMBERSHIP 123–30
(2010).
49. Ovsak, supra note 42, at 1178 n.1.
50. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 219–20.
51. CLELAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 5; David E. Wilkins, Fish in the Lakes,
Wild Rice, and Game in Abundance: Testimony on Behalf of Mille Lacs Ojibwe
Hunting and Fishing Rights, 24 AM. INDIAN Q. 645, 647 (2000) (book review).
As Cleland points out, the reluctance of the U.S. Courts to accept oral testimony
exacerbates this problem for American Indians. CLELAND ET AL., supra note 2,
at 7. For a fuller discussion of the difficulties of Indian treaty interpretation, see
Angela R. Hoeft, Coming Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from
an International Human Rights Perspective, 14 LAW & INEQ. 203, 248–50
(1995).
52. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784,
841 (D. Minn. 1994).
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findings drawn from a lengthy record and live testimony to support this holding.53 Her opinion demonstrates her astute awareness of the politics surrounding a case54—particularly a hotly
contested one—and her commitment to respecting the parties by
fairly applying legal precedents and evaluating the evidence.55
Few opinions illustrate how the facts matter as clearly and
concisely as Judge Murphy’s opinion in Mille Lacs. As a law professor, I repeatedly tell my students that the facts matter. I am
not sure most of them believe it, and I wish I could make them
all read Mille Lacs (but I have yet to figure out how to assign it
in a first year civil procedure course). The opinion is remarkable
because it identifies and properly considers relevant facts that
are not in the record as well as ones that are in the record. Acknowledging that American treaty negotiators often left Indians
out of the official narrative, Judge Murphy perceives what is
missing from the record. She uses the broader historical record
to contextualize the facts and accord them their proper weight
as evidence. For example, her opinion emphasizes the fact that
the Chippewa would not have given up the hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights that they fought so hard to retain in 1837 without even discussing the matter in the 1855 treaty negotiations.56
Her perceptiveness here demonstrates another unique and
important aspect of her opinion. Unlike most federal judges,
Judge Murphy successfully gives voice to a people purposefully
left out of the historical narrative. Her opinion reveals her exceptional ability to see and value cultures and ways of life distinct from her own and to use the law to respect a world foreign
to it.
Another impressive aspect of Judge Murphy’s opinion is that
it never loses sight of the fact that it is interpreting historically
contingent facts. The state argued that the Band’s rights had
been terminated by an 1850 Executive Order and an 1855
Treaty.57 In evaluating the evidence, Judge Murphy placed these
documents in their appropriate historical contexts. This is evident in her findings that neither the 1850 order nor the 1855
53. Id. at 840.
54. Id. at 789 (noting the “widespread interest” in the case and “fears about
the possible impact of any court decision”).
55. Id. (“The court is respectful of all those before it and of the varying interests in the outcome, but it must be guided in its task of decision by the legal
precedents and a fair evaluation of the evidence developed in the record and at
trial.”).
56. Id. at 832.
57. Id. at 789–90.
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treaty abrogated Chippewa fishing, hunting, and gathering
rights under the 1837 treaty. Judge Murphy situated the 1850
order in the broader historical context of removal, which dominated federal Indian policy at the time.58 This context facilitates
an understanding of the order more consistent with what was
happening at the time it was issued and prevents misinterpretation of the order by mistakenly viewing it through an ahistorical
lens.
Perhaps, most important for American Indian peoples, who
are often relegated to the distant past rather than understood as
active agents strengthening their culture for future generations,
Judge Murphy’s opinion presents the Chippewa as vibrant, living people rather than being frozen in time. In her findings on
the scope of the retained rights, she explained that the rights
retained in the 1837 treaty were not just an incident of Indian
title but were a treaty held right of use,59 included harvesting
resources for commercial purposes, and were “not limited to use
of any particular techniques, methods, devices, or gear.”60 These
findings both enable the Chippewa to continue traditional practices, such as spearfishing, and yet to adapt and change over
time.
Judge Murphy’s carefully constructed and sound opinion
made affirmance by the Supreme Court possible,61 perhaps even
easy, at a time when the Court found against Indian interests in

58. Id. at 824 (“Since the Chippewa living in the 1837 ceded territory had
not consented to removal as required by Congress, President Taylor acted outside of his authority when he issued the 1850 executive order requiring their
removal from that area.”).
59. Id. at 832.
60. Id. at 838.
61. In her opinion on the merits, Judge Murphy denied the defendants’ request for an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 839–40. The defendants immediately
appealed, and the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal as premature. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 48 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1995). The
Honorable Michael J. Davis presided over Phase II of the case as Judge Murphy
had been appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 911 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1997). Several Wisconsin Bands intervened in the case, and the defendants
were allowed to assert new defenses. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 186 (1999). At the end of Phase II of the case, the defendants appealed rulings made in both Phase I and II of the case. See Mille Lacs,
124 F.3d at 907 (summarizing the procedural history of the case). The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the Chippewa retained their
hunting, fishing, and harvesting rights under the 1837 Treaty. See id. at 934.
Judge Murphy recused herself from the appeals of the case heard by the Eighth
Circuit. Id. at 907.
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over seventy-five percent of the Indian law cases it heard62 and
frequently ignored the canons of treaty construction.63 The majority opinion clearly took note of her meticulous review of the
historical record, careful weighing of the expert evidence, and
application of the canons of treaty construction.64 Reiterating the
importance of the established canons of treaty interpretation, it
adopted her findings that the 1850 order did not abrogate Chippewa hunting, fishing, and gathering rights because it was invalid and intended to secure removal,65 that the 1855 treaty neither referenced the rights reserved in the 1837 treaty nor sought
to abrogate them,66 and that the lack of reference to the rights in
the treaty negotiations strongly suggested that the parties did
not intend to abrogate these rights.67 The Court, thus, secured
the rights of the Chippewa to hunt, fish, and gather on ceded
lands in Wisconsin and Minnesota.68 More broadly, the Court reaffirmed that the federal government cannot terminate Indian
treaty rights by implication, and that “states lack inherent

62. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit
of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV.
267, 280 (2001) (finding that tribes lost eighty-two percent of the cases decided
by the Supreme Court from 1991–2000); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as a Barrier to Justice for Indian
Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 943 (2009) (showing that the success rate of tribal
litigants in the Supreme Court did not improve after 2001).
63. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[3], at 125–26 (Nell
Jessup Newton ed., 2005) (discussing how canons of treaty construction have
been utilized in Supreme Court cases involving Indian tribes).
64. The Band also relied heavily on Judge Murphy’s development of the
factual record in their arguments before the Supreme Court. See Slonim, supra
note 28, at 138.
65. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188–95.
66. Id. at 195 (“This sentence, however, does not mention the 1837 Treaty,
and it does not mention hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The entire 1855
Treaty, in fact, is devoid of any language expressly mentioning—much less abrogating—usufructuary rights. Similarly, the Treaty contains no language
providing money for the abrogation of previously held rights. These omissions
are telling because the United States treaty drafters had the sophistication and
experience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights.”).
67. Id. at 198 (“[T]he Treaty Journal, recording the course of the negotiations themselves, is silent with respect to usufructuary rights. The journal records no discussion of the 1837 Treaty, of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights,
or of the abrogation of those rights . . . . This silence suggests that the Chippewa
did not understand the proposed Treaty to abrogate their usufructuary rights
as guaranteed by other treaties.”).
68. Slonim, supra note 28, at 138 (noting that the decision conclusively determined these rights and secured earlier decisions upholding them).
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power over Indian lands, rights, or resources absent express congressional consent. . . .”69
In addition to its tremendous legal significance, Mille Lacs
has had profound practical implications for the lives of the Anishinaabek. It remains vitally important to the Mille Lacs Band
and its members. Chief Executive Melanie Benjamin of the Mille
Lacs Band of Ojibwe explains:
At a moment in history when the rights of tribes were especially politically unpopular, the Band sought justice from the federal courts.
Judge Murphy took on a complex, unpopular case and came to a difficult and unpopular decision. We knew our case was strong and hoped
she would do the right thing—which she did. She faithfully followed
the law. Even so, her decision took great courage and a deep strength
of character. When I look at her career, and her impact on our people,
today she stands like a giant.70

The decision had a tremendous impact on the ground. By recognizing the authority of the Mille Lacs Band, it substantially altered the regulation and management of fishing, hunting, and
gathering on the 1837 ceded lands in Minnesota.71 In response,
individual Chippewa Bands, including the Mille Lacs Band, have
developed the capacity and institutions to regulate their resources.72 They have enacted conservation codes to regulate
tribal hunting, fishing, and gathering in the twelve counties that
constitute the 1837 ceded lands and along with the Minnesota
DNR and Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission,
they co-manage the walleye harvest.73 The Bands have also appointed conservation enforcement officers and used tribal court
69. Wilkins, supra note 51, at 646.
70. Personal correspondence with Exec. Office of the Mille Lacs Band (May
29, 2018) (on file with author). Judge Murphy’s decision remains controversial
today. See Joe Fellegy, “Indian Understanding” Judge Murphy Was Wrong!,
PROPER ECON. RESOURCE MGMT. (PERM), https://www.perm.org/articles/a034
.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
71. The Mille Lacs Band’s ability to regulate the fishery and engage in traditional practices remains controversial today. See PROPER ECON. RESOURCE
MGMT. (PERM), https://www.perm.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
72. See Minnesota Issues, supra note 42 (explaining how after the Mille
Lacs decision the harvesting of walleye was to be regulated by agreement between the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and the bands of Chippewa, which then became a five year management plan based on levels established in the 1837 Ceded Territories Fisheries Committee).
73. Id.; DNR Names 17 to Mille Lacs Fisheries Advisory Committee, MINN.
DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES (Oct. 6, 2015), http://news.dnr.state.mn.us/2015/10/06/
dnr-names-17-to-mille-lacs-fisheries-advisory-committee (noting the creation of
the Mille Lacs Fisheries Advisory Committee in 2015 by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources to advise the state agency on regulating fishing on
Mille Lacs Lake). The Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Commission monitors the
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systems to enforce their conservation codes.74 As a result, the
decision has greatly increased the ability of the Mille Lacs Band
to retain traditional practices. The Band has returned to gill netting, spearfishing, and manoomin harvesting on Mille Lacs
Lake.75 Its members have increasingly engaged in these traditional practices over time, ensuring that they will continue into
the future.76
The impact of Judge Murphy’s decision, however, has radiated beyond the Mille Lacs Band and other signatories of the
1837 Treaty. It has encouraged members of other Minnesota
Chippewa Bands to pursue the recognition of similar rights to
fish, hunt, and gather on ceded lands in northern Minnesota.77
More importantly, the decision has contributed to broader revitalization efforts of traditional practices in the Great Lakes.78
For example, in Michigan, several Anishinaabek bands are
working to cultivate and rejuvenate wild rice beds within their
traditional territories.79 The cultural renewal that Judge Murphy’s opinion in Mille Lacs contributed to has had a profound
impact on my own life. The year after I clerked for her, I married
a member of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians. We have committed to raising our two children as Anishinaabek and participate in many traditional activities, including harvesting and processing manoomin. Without the Judge’s
decision in Mille Lacs, this may not have been possible.
B. TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GAMING CORP. OF
AMERICA V. DORSEY & WHITNEY
Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney never captured the public’s attention quite like Mille Lacs did. Unlike
Mille Lacs, which developed out of centuries-old, serious, and direct conflicts among the Chippewa, state regulators, and sports
Band and also participates in conservation planning with the Minnesota DNR.
Matthew Steffes, Implications for the Mille Lacs Lake Fishery with Continued
Enforcement of the 1837 Treaty of St. Peters, 35 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 367,
382 (2014).
74. CLELAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 338–39.
75. Dennis Anderson, Mille Lacs Band Says It’ll Exercise Spearing Rights,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 16, 1994, at 12A.
76. Steffes, supra note 73, at 386 (“Since 1997 tribal gillnets have increased
from fewer than 500 in 1997 to more than 3,250 in 2011.”).
77. Minnesota Issues, supra note 42.
78. Slonim, supra note 28, at 132.
79. See, e.g., BARBARA J. BARTON, MANOOMIN: THE STORY OF WILD RICE IN
MICHIGAN 129 (2018) (discussing how ricing is a part of ongoing cultural restoration).
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fisherman, the dispute in Gaming Corp. arose from an important, modern form of tribal economic development—Indian
gaming.80
Very few contemporary forces have transformed Indian
country as much as Indian gaming.81 In 1987 in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme Court held that,
in states that do not prohibit gaming, Indian nations could operate gaming establishments free of state regulation.82 Congress
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) a year later.83
IGRA sought to clarify the standards and structure for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands.84 To do so, it chose to balance
the interests of three sovereigns—federal, state, and tribal governments.85 It also clearly stated that its purpose was “to benefit
80. Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir.
1996).
81. See generally STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN
GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE (2005) (discussing the law, politics, and impact of Indian gaming); W. DALE MASON, INDIAN
GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (analyzing policy and political conflicts involving Indian gaming in the United States); THE
NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING: THE RISE OF RESERVATION INTEREST
GROUPS (Kenneth N. Hansen & Tracy A. Skopek eds., 2011) (discussing the politics of Indian gaming across the United States); Randall K. Q. Akee et al., The
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effects on American Indian Economic
Development, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 185 (2015) (providing a quantitative analysis
of Indian gaming and discussing IGRA’s effect on gaming); Kathryn R.L. Rand
& Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 381 (1997) (discussing the growth of Indian gaming and how IGRA impacted its growth).
82. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 210–12
(1987).
83. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). Interestingly, Indian nations did not uniformly
support the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. For a detailed history of the IGRA’s enactment, see Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988: The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or
Another Federal Usurpation of Tribal Sovereignty?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 17–19
(2010).
84. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 443.
85. IGRA did this by creating a comprehensive scheme for regulating Indian gaming. It defined three classes of gaming activity subject to different jurisdictions and levels of regulation. Tribes have exclusive authority to regulate
Class I gaming, which includes tribal traditional games. 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2703(7)(A), 2710(a) (2012). The Act codified tribal regulation of Class II
games or high stakes bingo as upheld by the Court in Cabazon, but required the
approval of Class II gaming ordinances and issuance of tribal gaming licenses
by an independent federal regulatory agency, the National Indian Gaming Commission. Id. §§ 2703(7)(A)–(B) (defining Class II gaming); id. § 2710(b)(2) (explaining the role of the National Indian Gaming Commission). All other nontraditional games, including casino-style gaming, were categorized as Class III
gaming. Id. § 2703(8). Tribes could only conduct Class III gaming if the state
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Indian tribes, not the states, and to expand tribal opportunities
for self-determination, self-government, economic development,
and political stability.”86
With the uncertainty of the legality of gaming resolved,
many Indian nations sought to open gaming operations after
Congress enacted IGRA.87 These efforts frequently generated
conflicts between tribes and the management companies hired
to help them finance, build, and manage casinos.88 These disputes raised important questions about the impact of IGRA on
state law.
Judge Murphy played a key role in the interpretation of
IGRA by issuing the first federal appellate decision holding that
IGRA completely preempts state laws that interfere with tribal
regulation of gaming on Indian lands.89 Her opinion for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Gaming Corp. was
unanimous and never reviewed by the Supreme Court. It remains widely recognized as the leading case on IGRA’s complete
preemption of state law regulating Indian gaming.90 Her decision maintained the delicate balance among state, federal, and
tribal authority Congress reached in IGRA, reaffirmed the central tenant of federal Indian law prohibiting state authority
without tribal consent, and protected tribal sovereignty from potential encroachments from state courts and private corporations.
Gaming Corp. emerged out of a dispute between the HoChunk Nation and two management companies over the operation of a casino in Baraboo, Wisconsin.91 After negotiating a gaming compact with the state of Wisconsin in 1992, the Ho-Chunk
Nation, a federally recognized tribe then known as the Wisconsin

did not prohibit all forms of these games and they entered into a compact with
the state that decided basic issues about the tribal gaming operations. Id.
§ 2710(d).
86. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 443.
87. See William V. Ackerman & Rick L. Bunch, A Comparative Analysis of
Indian Gaming in the United States, 36 AM. INDIAN Q. 50, 51 (2012).
88. See, e.g., CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM CASES AND MATERIALS 874–78 (6th ed.
2010).
89. Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 544 (8th Cir.
1996).
90. See, e.g., Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Preemption of State Law by
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 93, 105–06, 107 (2008).
91. Gaming Corp., 88 F.3d at 540.
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Winnebago,92 entered into a management agreement with
Golden Nickel Casinos, Inc. (Golden Nickel), a Minnesota corporation involved in casino management.93 Golden Nickel agreed
to finance the construction of the Ho-Chunk Casino Baraboo and
to maintain a valid license from the Winnebago Gaming Commission at all times.94 In May 1993, the Winnebago Gaming
Commission granted Golden Nickel a provisional license that
would expire at the end of that year.95 Golden Nickel had plans
to merge with Gaming Corporation of America (Gaming Corp.),
a casino management company partially owned by the same individuals, and the management agreement required Gaming
Corp. to acquire a license if they merged.96 Golden Nickel applied
for a permanent gaming license in December 1993, and Gaming
Corp. applied for one several months later. The Ho-Chunk Casino in Baraboo opened in 1993.97
The Ho-Chunk Nation hired Dorsey & Whitney, a Minneapolis-based law firm, to represent it during the process of developing the casino.98 Dorsey had represented Gaming Corp. until
April 1993 and advised both Golden Nickel and the Nation that
the tribe’s interests could be adverse to Golden Nickel’s.99 Golden
Nickel consented to Dorsey’s representation of the tribe.100
Dorsey assisted the tribal gaming commission in evaluating the
licensing applications and presented evidence at several commission hearings on them.101 The tribal gaming commission denied the applications of both Golden Nickel and Gaming Corp.,
finding that the owners of the management companies had violated the terms of the provisional license.102 The Nation subsequently terminated its management contract with Golden
Nickel.103
The Ho-Chunk Nation settled with Golden Nickel and Gaming Corp. after the management companies appealed the gaming
92. The Wisconsin Winnebago changed their name to the Ho-Chunk Nation
in 1994. Id. at 539.
93. Id. at 540.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 539.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 540.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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commission’s decision in tribal court.104 The management companies sued Dorsey in Minnesota state court in September 1994,
alleging common law violations related to the licensing process,
breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.105 Dorsey removed the case to federal court, arguing that
the claims raised federal questions under IGRA.106 After finding
that IGRA did not completely preempt state law, the district
court dismissed some of the claims and remanded the rest to
state court.107
On appeal, the management companies argued that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their facially
state law claims.108 Dorsey countered that the district court
abused its discretion in remanding the remaining claims to the
state court because IGRA completely preempted state law and
all of the remaining claims therefore arose under federal law.109
Judge Murphy reversed the district court in a unanimous
opinion, holding that IGRA completely preempted state law regulation of Indian gaming unless a tribal-state compact provided
otherwise.110 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Murphy’s opinion combined a close examination of the text and history of
IGRA, its legislative history, and its jurisprudential framework
with a broader understanding of the principles of federal Indian
law and the congressional policy of tribal self-determination.
Judge Murphy’s interpretation of IGRA and its legislative
history reveals her deep understanding of the delicate regulatory
balance Congress reached in IGRA. States have long been described as the tribes’ deadliest enemies,111 and Indian gaming
has often inflamed the historic conflict between the two.112
States and tribes fought over regulating gaming, and while the
states lost in Cabazon, they regained in IGRA some of what they
104. Id.
105. Id. at 540.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 541.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 544.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Indian
nations] owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are
often their deadliest enemies.”).
112. See, e.g., JEFF CORNTASSEL & RICHARD C. WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 4 (2008); MASON, supra note 81, at 45.
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had lost in court.113 Judge Murphy’s opinion explains that allowing state courts to decide disputes related to tribal regulatory
decisions could upset Congress’s balance among state, federal,
and tribal authority in IGRA by according more power to the
states than the statute intended. IGRA limited state power over
gaming unless a tribe specifically agreed to such authority in a
tribal-state compact.114 Rather than acknowledge state court authority, “[e]very reference to court action in IGRA specified federal court jurisdiction.”115 Further, IGRA restricted federal
courts by balancing state, federal, and tribal regulatory interests
instead of leaving such assessments to the federal courts.116 In
finding that IGRA preempts state regulation, her opinion adheres to IGRA’s purposes, ensures that claims arising under
IGRA that may affect a tribe’s regulation of gaming activities are
treated as federal questions, and conforms with the established
federal Indian law principle requiring tribal consent before a
state extends its jurisdiction over tribes.
More significantly, Judge Murphy’s opinion acknowledges
and gives voice to Indian interests by exposing how a dispute
between two non-Indian entities can have profound effects on an
Indian tribe and its ability to govern its own affairs.117 Despite
its emphasis on a modern form of tribal economic development,
Gaming Corp. represents a distinctive and all too frequent historical trend in Indian law cases. Federal judges overseeing
Western-style courts have frequently had to make decisions
about Indians without any Indians actually present in the case.
This factual scenario may seem strange, but federal courts have
made decisions about Indians without their direct involvement
in the litigation since Justice Marshall handed down Johnson v.
M’Intosh in 1823.118 Often federal judges fail to comprehend how
these cases affect the non-party Indians, and the Indians have
no voice. Judge Murphy does not make this mistake. Her opinion
113. For a detailed history of the IGRA’s enactment, see Clinton, supra note
83, at 17.
114. Gaming Corp., 88 F.3d at 545 (“The legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend to transfer any jurisdictional or regulatory power to the
states by means of IGRA unless a tribe consented to such a transfer in a tribalstate compact.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 544, 546–47.
117. Not all federal judges have demonstrated such an awareness. For example, the Supreme Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997),
overlooked how restricting the ability of the tribe to adjudicate accidents between non-members within its reservation may harm the tribe.
118. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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accurately perceives the management companies as attempting
to use state law to challenge a decision validly made by a tribal
government’s internal processes—something IGRA intended to
prohibit by creating a comprehensive structure for regulating Indian gaming that greatly limited state regulation.119 Thus, while
her opinion did not determine which state claims were
preempted by IGRA, it did suggest a standard that considered
the interests of both the tribes and states but preserved tribal
authority over gaming. She proposed that “[t]hose causes of action which would interfere with the nation’s ability to govern
gaming should fall within the scope of IGRA’s preemption of
state law.”120 Her proposal protects the tribe’s interests (despite
its absence from the case) and furthers IGRA’s goals of fostering
tribal sovereignty and economic development by ensuring tribes’
authority and ability to regulate gaming activities on their land.
Gaming Corp. illustrates one of Judge Murphy’s greatest
strengths—her ability (and desire) to build consensus through
meticulous and thoughtful deliberation and writing. Her careful
construction of the holding, built on detailed consideration of
both Indian law and non-Indian law cases, created a solid foundation for the rare conclusion of complete preemption. She did
not overreach. Always respectful of the role of the district courts,
the opinion left the application of the principles underlying the
holding to the district court on remand, after further development by the parties. The end result was an opinion that earned
the unanimous support of her colleagues on the panel, which
may have come as a surprise to some. Certainly not limited to
her Indian law cases, Judge Murphy’s commitment to collegiality and her skill in framing issues to build consensus should be
touchstones for lawyers and judges in a world increasingly divided by ideology.
Gaming Corp. is widely recognized as the leading case on
IGRA’s complete preemption of state law regulating Indian gaming.121 The Supreme Court never reviewed the case, and many
courts have treated it as a foundational opinion in their analyses

119. Gaming Corp., 88 F.3d at 549 (“Nothing in the structure created by
IGRA or in the tribal-state compact here suggests that the management companies should have the right to use state law to challenge the outcome of an
internal governmental decision by the nation.”).
120. Id. at 550.
121. See, e.g., Kemper, supra note 90, at 108.
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of whether IGRA preempts state law.122 As of this writing, the
opinion has been cited 231 times by federal courts, 27 times by
state courts, 171 times in court documents, and 26 times in law
reviews.123
At its simplest and most straightforward, Gaming Corp.’s
real world impact has been to ensure that disputes arising out of
tribal regulatory actions are heard by federal (or tribal) not state
courts.124 Consistent with the principles of federal Indian law, it
has protected tribal sovereignty by preventing management
companies and state courts from undermining internal tribal
court decisions.125
More broadly, Gaming Corp. both relied on and affirmed
tribal sovereignty and the ability of tribes to develop economically by reinforcing the purposes of IGRA and reiterating the potential benefits of gaming for tribal economic development and
survival. Gaming has not been a panacea for all tribes,126 but it
has turned out to be a game changer for some, including the HoChunk Nation.127 Like most gaming tribes, the Ho-Chunk Nation has used gaming revenue to ensure its survival and
strengthen its tribal community.128 Tribal unemployment has
decreased while the number of college graduates and homeowners has increased.129 Gaming revenues have enabled the Nation
to build infrastructure, such as courts, administrative offices,
and law enforcement services, create educational, health, and
122. See, e.g., Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1172
(M.D. Ala. 2014); Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah),
36 F. Supp. 3d 229, 237 (D. Mass. 2014); see also Kemper, supra note 90.
123. Lexis search on September 27, 2018.
124. See, e.g., Kemper, supra note 90, at 107–09 (discussing how Gaming
Corp. held that the IGRA completely preempts state law and how the court in
Gaming Corp. analyzed that every mention of court in the IGRA was to federal
rather than state court jurisdiction).
125. See generally Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (discussing how
exercising state court jurisdiction over a tribal adoption matter would be an
interference with the tribe’s autonomy); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)
(concluding that the state of Arizona did not have authority or jurisdiction onreservation affairs).
126. Helen Oliff, Indian Gaming: Not a Gold Rush, WHISPER N THUNDER
(2013), http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/DocServer/Indian_Gaming_Not_
a_Gold_Rush_-_WnT__07.01.13.pdf?docID=4601. The benefits of gaming are
also unevenly distributed in Indian country. Id.
127. Bill Lueders, Gambling Has Given Ho-Chunk New Hope, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2014/03/gambling
-has-given-ho-chunk-new-hope.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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other programs for its 7,400 members, and preserve its language
and culture.130
II. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
Judge Murphy profoundly affected the daily lives of American Indians through her jurisprudence but her legacy does not
end there. Judge Murphy played an integral role in increasing
awareness of the issues faced by Native Americans and tribes
under the federal sentencing guidelines as chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 1999 to 2004. The federal government
has a special trust relationship with Indian tribes and exercises
jurisdiction over felonies committed in Indian country.131 As a
result, Native Americans who commit serious crimes disproportionately face federal prosecution.132 Yet the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, which establishes sentencing policies and practices
for federal courts, had not seriously considered the unique problems that the federal sentencing guidelines pose to Native Americans and tribes prior to Judge Murphy’s tenure.133
Judge Murphy added Native American issues to the agenda
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and encouraged it to take its
responsibilities to Indian tribes more seriously. In 1999, concerned members of the Native American community raised issues about the discriminatory impacts of the federal sentencing
guidelines on Indians to the South Dakota Advisory Committee
to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.134 The U.S. Sentencing
Commission then held its own public hearing in South Dakota
in 2001 to investigate these concerns.135
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
132. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE
FEDERAL OFFENDER POPULATION 1 (2013), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Native_American_
Offenders.pdf.
133. Created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission is an independent federal agency within the judicial branch. In addition to establishing sentencing policies and practices, it advises policymakers
in the development of crime policy, and collects, analyzes, and distributes research on crime and sentencing issues to policymakers, practitioners, academics, and the public. About, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/
about (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
134. AD HOC ADVISORY GRP. ON NATIVE AM. SENTENCING ISSUES, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP 3, 10
(2003), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/20031104_Native_American_
Advisory_Group_Report.pdf.
135. Id. at 3.
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Under Judge Murphy’s leadership, the Sentencing Commission responded to the concerns expressed at these hearings and
in a 2000 report of the South Dakota Advisory Committee by
forming an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Native American Sentencing Issues in 2002.136 The Sentencing Commission had never before constituted an Advisory Group to study sentencing issues
particular to tribes and tribal citizens.137 The Advisory Group’s
charge was “to consider any viable methods to improve the operation of the federal sentencing guidelines in their application to
Native Americans prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act.”138 It
met several times over the next year. Its comparison of the sentences received by Native American defendants charged under
the Major Crimes Act and sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines with defendants sentenced in state courts for similar crimes revealed that the impact of the federal sentencing
guidelines varied by offense and jurisdiction.139 It made recommendations to the Commission specific to each of the three offense categories it studied.140 More generally, it strongly encouraged the Sentencing Commission to formalize mechanisms to
consult regularly with tribes both individually and nationally.141
Judge Murphy’s creation of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group generated interest in and research on the impact of the guidelines
on American Indians and federal courts even though none of its
recommendations were enacted.142 Scholars have produced several empirical studies on the sentencing of Native Americans in
federal courts and tried to determine whether a disparity exists
between the treatment of Native American defendants sentenced in federal court and non-Indians sentenced in state courts

136. Id. at 3, 10.
137. Id.
138. Sentencing Commission Convenes Native American Ad Hoc Advisory
Group, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION (May 1, 2002), https://www.ussc.gov/about/
news/press-releases/may-1-2002.
139. AD HOC ADVISORY GRP., supra note 134, at i–iv.
140. Id. at ii.
141. Id. at iv, 38.
142. The recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group were included among the Commission’s policy priorities for the 2003–04 amendment
cycle, 2003 Year-End Report, SUP. CT. U.S. (Jan. 1, 2004), https://www
.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.aspx, but did not
move forward. B.J. Jones & Christopher J. Ironroad, Addressing Sentencing
Disparities for Tribal Citizens in the Dakotas: A Tribal Sovereignty Approach,
89 N.D. L. REV. 53, 68 (2013).
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for similar crimes.143 Scholars and advocates have also made
multiple proposals for revising the guidelines to address issues
related to Native Americans in tribal courts and federal
courts.144 The issues raised by the Native American Ad Hoc Advisory Group have not gone away and the attention paid to them
has increased over time.145
The longstanding interest in the federal sentencing of American Indians stimulated by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group encouraged the U.S. Sentencing Commission to announce the formation
of a second Tribal Issues Advisory Group (TIAG) in 2015.146 The
Sentencing Commission gave the TIAG a broad mandate to (1)
assist the Commission in carrying out its statutory responsibilities; (2) provide its views on federal sentencing issues relating to
American Indians; (3) study a range of issues related to the application of the guidelines in Indian country, including disparities in the sentencing of American Indians in federal courts as
compared to sentencing in state and tribal courts; and (4) recom-

143. See generally Travis W. Franklin, Sentencing Native Americans in US
Federal Courts: An Examination of Disparity, 30 JUST. Q. 310 (2013) (finding
that Native Americans, and specifically young Native American males, tend to
receive more punitive sentences than other groups); Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Mindy
S. Bradley, Punishment in Indian Country: Ironies of Federal Punishment of
Native Americans, 35 JUST. Q. 1 (2017) (analyzing sentencing disparities for Native Americans in federal courts).
144. See, e.g., Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing
Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 725 (2008); Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Sovereign Comity: Factors Recognizing Tribal Court Criminal Convictions in State and Federal Courts, 45 CT. REV. 12, 16 (2009); Jones & Ironroad,
supra note 142, at 53–54; Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 403–06 (2004); Gregory D. Smith, Comment, Disparate Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country: Why Congress Should Run the Erie Railroad into the Major Crimes Act, 27
HAMLINE L. REV. 483, 488 (2004); Emily Tredeau, Comment, Tribal Control in
Federal Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1409 (2011).
145. See, e.g., Celia M. Rumann & Jon M. Sands, Lost In Incarceration: The
Native American Advisory Group’s Suggested Treatment For Sex Offenders, 16
FED. SENT’G REP. 208, 208 (2004) (discussing how Indian offenses make up a
significant portion of the violent crime prosecutions in federal courts, despite
accounting for less than five percent of the overall federal case load); Washburn,
supra note 144, at 403 (stating that Native Americans are likely affected more
by the federal sentencing guidelines than any other group in the United States).
146. Dan Frosch, Panel Reviews Native American Sentencing, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 2015, at A3; see also Letter from Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, Dist.
of N.D., Chair, Tribal Issues Advisory Grp., to Tribal Leader (July 2, 2015),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/advisory-groups/tribal-issues
-advisory-group/20150707_Consultation_Materials.pdf.
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mend mechanisms by which the Commission could establish regular and meaningful consultation with tribes.147 This mandate
reflects the recommendations made by the 2003 Ad Hoc Advisory
Group to the Sentencing Commission that it enhance its interactions with tribes. The Sentencing Commission directed the TIAG
to conduct formal consultation and outreach to tribes consistent
with the earlier recommendation.148
In a 2016 report, the TIAG forcefully reiterated recommendations about how the Sentencing Commission could strengthen
its relationship with and better fulfil its commitment to Indian
nations originally made by the 2003 Advisory Group.149 The Sentencing Commission has taken steps to implement some of these
recommendations, including the ones encouraging tribal outreach and consultation.150
As a result of the recommendations of the two tribal advisory groups, the Sentencing Commission has recognized its trust
relationship with tribes and indicated its commitment to consulting with them through the creation of a permanent TIAG.151
The TIAG has been tasked, inter alia, with providing the Commission with its views on federal sentencing issues relating to
American Indian defendants and victims and to offenses committed in Indian country; engaging in meaningful consultation
and outreach with tribes, tribal governments, and tribal organizations regarding federal sentencing issues that have tribal implications; and disseminating information regarding federal sentencing issues to tribes, tribal governments, and tribal
organizations.152 The formation of a permanent TIAG indicates
that the Commission is committed to consulting and engaging

147. TRIBAL ISSUES ADVISORY GRP., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT OF
TRIBAL ISSUES ADVISORY GROUP 3 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2016/
20160606_TIAG-Report.pdf.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. The TIAG also found insufficient data to determine whether American Indian defendants are treated differently under the federal sentencing
guidelines than defendants sentenced for analogous crimes in state courts and
made several recommendations about how federal agencies could generate the
data necessary to determine whether sentencing disparities exist. Id. at 5–8.
150. Letter from Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, Dist. of N.D., Chair, Tribal
Issues Advisory Grp., to Tribal Leader (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.tribal
database.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TIAG-Consultation-materials.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Advisory Groups, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/
about/who-we-are/advisory-groups (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
THE
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with Indian tribes to resolve the unique sentencing issues faced
by Native Americans.
Without Judge Murphy, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
may have continued to overlook Native American issues despite
the federal trust relationship with Indian nations, the federal
government’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country,
and the numbers of Indians in the federal criminal system. Her
efforts placed them on the agenda and inspired others to keep
them there. As a result, the Commission is taking its responsibilities to Indian nation more seriously.
CONCLUSION
Most federal judges leave the bench with only a jurisprudential legacy. But Judge Murphy is not, and never has been, like
most federal judges. She was the first woman appointed to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and she remained the
only women on the court for decades.153 Unlike many federal appellate judges, she served as a district court judge for over a decade before joining the Court of Appeals.154 Judge Murphy
brought this experience and perspective as well as her keen intellect and impeccable sense of fairness to all her endeavors. She
was never afraid to raise pressing issues or voice dissent when
necessary. It’s not surprising that her legacy extends beyond the
cases she decided. She positively affected the federal judiciary,
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and countless individual lives.
In particular, Judge Murphy profoundly influenced federal
Indian law and the direction of federal Indian policy as a federal
judge and as Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. This specialized and complicated area of the law never fazed her. She
recognized Indian nations and their people for what they are:
sovereign governments with distinctive cultures and ways of life.
Moreover, she saw their inherent value and found ways to protect them in a democratic legal system largely foreign to them.
Judge Murphy’s legacy will positively affect Indian country for
many years to come.

153. Jones, supra note 8.
154. Diana Murphy ’74, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge for the Eighth Circuit,
Dies, U. MINN. L. SCH. (May 17, 2018), https://www.law.umn.edu/news/2018-05
-17-diana-murphy-74-us-court-appeals-judge-eighth-circuit-dies.

